Transformations of normal form games by preplay offers for payments
  among players by Goranko, Valentin
Transformations of normal form games
by preplay offers for payments among players
Valentin Goranko
Technical University of Denmark, email: vfgo@imm.dtu.dk
August 6, 2012
Abstract
We consider transformations of normal form games by binding preplay offers of
players for payments of utility to other players conditional on them playing des-
ignated in the offers strategies. The game-theoretic effect of such preplay offers is
transformation of the payoff matrix of the game by transferring payoffs between play-
ers. Here we analyze and completely characterize the possible transformations of the
payoff matrix of a normal form game by sets of preplay offers.
Keywords: normal form games preplay offers side payments game transformations
1 Introduction: the conceptual basis
It is well known that some normal form games have no pure strategy Nash equilibria, while
others, like the Prisoners’ Dilemma, have rather unsatisfactory – e.g., strongly Pareto
dominated – ones. Sometimes, mutually more beneficial outcomes can be achieved if
players could communicate and make binding offers for payments of bonuses to other
players before the play of the game in order to provide additional incentives for them to
play desired strategies. More precisely, we assume the possibility that:
Before playing the game any player A can make a binding offer to any other
player B to pay him, after the game is played, a declared amount of utility δ if
B plays a strategy s specified in the offer by A.
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Here is our basic assumption in more details:
• Any preplay offer of a player A is binding and irrevocable for A, and only contingent
on B playing the strategy s specified by A.
• However, such offer does not create any obligation for B (and, therefore, it does not
transform the game into a cooperative one), as B is still at liberty to choose his
strategy when the game is actually played.
• Offers can neither be withdrawn nor rejected. However, as we will show, they can
be effectively cancelled by a suitable exchange of ’counter-offers’ by both players
involved.
• Offers can only be made for non-negative payments. Again, we will show that nega-
tive offers (regarded as threats for punishment) can be simulated, but only by coop-
eration of both players involved.
• In principle, preplay offers are unbounded. In reality, offers of rational players are
bounded above by the currently maximal payoff in the game.
• We only consider offers contingent on pure strategies, even though players can still
play mixed strategies.
Every player can make several offers, to different players, so the possible behaviours of
the players remain, in principle, complex and unconstrained.
A key observation: every preplay offer transforms the normal form game into another
one, by an explicitly defined transformation of the payoff matrix.
In this paper we study the purely mathematical effect of preplay offers on the payoff
matrices of normal form games, disregarding any rationality considerations that may pre-
scribe to players if and what offers to make. That is, here we are only interested in how
a game matrix can be transformed by preplay offers, but not why players may wish to
exchange offers in order to effect a given possible transformation. The latter, which is the
truly game theoretic question, we study in the separate papers [GTa, GTb].
The contributions of the present paper are technical: we characterize completely and
rather transparently the game matrix transformations that can be induced by preplay offers
of the type described above.
We note that somewhat more general types of side payments – not only positive but
also possibly negative (threats for punishments) and contingent not just on the recipient’s
strategy but also on own actions, or on an entire strategy profile (i.e., on an outcome) –
have been studied before in the literature, most notably by Jackson and Wilkie [JW05]
and the recent follow-up by Ellingsen and Paltseva [EP11]. There are some essential differ-
ences in the assumptions made in those papers and in the present work, and respectively
in the game-theoretic properties and effect of such payments, as demonstrated in [GTa]
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and [GTb]. As we show in the present paper, the game matrix transformations induced
by preplay offers considered here can simulate negative payments, but not the offers for
payments contingent on strategy profiles considered in [JW05] and [EP11].
2 Preplay offers and payoff matrix transformations
2.1 A motivating example
Consider a standard version of the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) game with a payoff matrix
I\II C D
C 4, 4 0, 5
D 5, 0 1, 1
The only Nash Equilibrium is (D,D) with the paltry payoff (1,1).
Now, suppose I makes to II a binding offer to pay her 2 utils after the game if II plays
C. That offer transforms the game by transferring 2 utils from the payoff of I to the payoff
of II in every entry of the column of the game matix, where II plays C, as follows:
I\II C D
C 2, 6 0, 5
D 3, 2 1, 1
In this game, player I still has the incentive to play D, which strictly dominates C for
him, but the dominant strategy for II now is C, and thus the only Nash Equilibrium is
(D,C) with payoff (3,2) – strictly better than the original payoff (1,1).
Of course, II can now realize that player I has no incentive to cooperate yet. That
incentive, however, can be created if player II, too, makes an offer to pay 2 utils to player
I after the game, if I cooperates. Then the game transforms as follows:
I\II C D
C 4, 4 2, 3
D 3, 2 1, 1
In this game, the only Nash Equilibrium is (C,C) with payoff (4,4), which is Pareto
optimal. Note that this is the same payoff for (C,C) as in the original PD game, but
now both players have transformed he game into one where they both have incentives to
cooperate, and have thus escaped from the trap of the original Nash Equilibrium (D,D).
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2.2 Transformations of normal form games by preplay offers
Now, let us generalize. Consider a general 2-person (for technical simplicity only) normal
form (NF) game with a payoff matrix
A\B B1 · · · Bj · · ·
A1 · · · · · · a1j, b1j · · ·
A2 · · · · · · a2j, b2j · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Ai · · · · · · aij, bij · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Suppose player A makes a preplay offer to player B to pay her additional utility δ ≥ 0
1 if B plays Bj. We will denote such offer by A
δ/Bj−−−→ B.
That offer transforms the payoff matrix of the game as follows:
A\B B1 · · · Bj · · ·
A1 · · · · · · a1j − δ, b1j + δ · · ·
A2 · · · · · · a2j − δ, b2j + δ · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Ai · · · · · · aij − δ, bij + δ · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
We will call such transformation of a payoff matrix a primitive offer-induced transfor-
mation, or a POI-transformation, for short.
Several preplay offers can be made by each player. Clearly, the transformation of a
payoff matrix induced by several preplay offers can be obtained by applying the POI-
transformations corresponding to each of the offers consecutively, in any order. We will
call such transformations offer-induced transformations, or OI-transformations, for short.
Thus, every OI-transformation corresponds to a set of preplay offers, respectively a set of
POI-transformations. Note that the sets generating a given OI-transformation need not
be unique. For instance, A can make two independent consecutive offers
A
δ1/Bj−−−→ B and A δ2/Bj−−−→ B equivalent to the offer A δ1+δ2/Bj−−−−−→ B.
Thus, every OI-transformation has a canonical form
{A δ
A
1 /B1−−−−→ B, . . . , A δ
A
m/Bm−−−−→ B} ∪ {B δ
B
1 /A1−−−−→ A, . . . , B δ
B
n /An−−−−→ A}
for some non-negative numbers δA1 , . . . δ
A
m, δ
B
1 , . . . δ
B
n .
That transformation changes the payoffs from (aij, bij) to (aˆij, bˆij) as follows:
aˆij = aij − δAj + δBi , bˆij = bij + δAj − δBi .
1Of course, preplay offers where δ = 0 make no difference in the game. The technical reason we allow
δ = 0 is to have an identity transformation at hand, but such vacuous offers can also be used by players
for signalling.
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Note that the players can collude to make any outcome, with any non-negative re-
distribution of the payoffs in it, a strictly dominant strategy equilibrium, by exchanging
sufficiently hight offers to make the strategies generating that outcome strictly dominant2.
3 The group of offer-induced game transformations
We begin with some useful general observations on OI-transformations of NF games for
any fixed number of players N .
1. An OI-transformation does not change the sum of the payoffs of all players in any
outcome, only re-distributes them. In particular, OI-transformations preserve the
class of zero-sum games.
2. An OI-transformation induced by a preplay offer of player A does not change the
preferences of A regarding his own strategies. In particular, (weak or strict) domi-
nance between strategies of player A is invariant under OI-transformations induced
by preplay offers of A, i.e.: a strategy Ai dominates (weakly, resp. strongly) a strat-
egy Aj before a transformation induced by a preplay offer made by A if and only if
Ai dominates (weakly, resp. strongly) Aj after the transformation.
Proposition 1 The set of all OI-transformations of payoff matrices of N-person strategic
games, for any fixed N >1, forms a commutative group under composition.
Proof. The composition of two OI-transformations is an OI-transformation, corre-
sponding to the union of the preplay offers generating the two transformations. Fur-
thermore, the composition of OI-transformations is clearly associative and commutative,
because the order of transforming the matrix with regards to the primitive preplay offers
generating the composed OI-transformations is not essential.
The OI-transformation corresponding to any offer A
0/Bj−−−→ B is the identity transfor-
mation.
The existence of an inverse OI-transformation to any OI-transformation is a bit trickier,
because an offered payment cannot be negative. However, note first that the inverse of
the POI-transformation corresponding to an offer A
δ/Bj−−−→ B can be composed from the
following offers:
• Player A makes an offer A δ/Bk−−−→ B for every strategy Bk of B, for k 6= j. That
basically means that A offers a reward δ to B if B does not play the strategy Bj.
• Player B makes an offer B δ/Ai−−−→ A for every strategy Ai of A. That basically means
that B offers unconditionally a refund δ to A.
2Clearly, rational players would only be interested in making offers inducing payoffs that are optimal
for them. Thus, a ‘preplay negotiation phase’ emerges which is studied in [GTa, GTb]; here we do not
take rationality considerations into account.
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The cumulative effect of these offers is that none of A and B gets anything from the
other if B plays any Bk where k 6= j, but if B plays Bj then she effectively pays back an
amount δ to A, thus canceling the offer A
δ/Bj−−−→ B
Finally, the inverse of any OI-transformation T can be obtained by composing the
inverses of the primitive OI-transformation of which T is composed.
The above proof also shows that offers for negative payments (i.e. threats of punish-
ments) can be effected by OI-transformations, too. Thus, henceforth we may assume that
an offered payment may be any real number, and an OI-transformation has a canonical
form
{A δ
A
1 /B1−−−−→ B, . . . , A δ
A
m/Bm−−−−→ B} ∪ {B δ
B
1 /A1−−−−→ A, . . . , B δ
B
n /An−−−−→ A}
for some real numbers δA1 , . . . δ
A
m, δ
B
1 , . . . δ
B
n .
Furthermore, OI-transformations can also simulate the more complex offers, such as
the conditional offers considered in [GTa].
On the other hand, it will follow form Theorem 2 that OI-transformations cannot
simulate the offers considered in [JW05] and [EP11], contingent not just on the recipient’s
strategy but on an entire strategy profile (i.e., on an outcome).
We denote the group of OI-transformations of N -person NF games by GNOIT . For a
given payoff matrix M we denote by GNOIT (M) the orbit of M under GNOIT , i.e., the result of
the action of that group on M , which is the set of all payoff matrices obtained by applying
OI-transformations to M . We will also call GNOIT (M) the OIT type of M . Note that,
because GNOIT is a group, the set of OIT types of NF game matrices forms a partition of
the set of NF game matrices and thus generates an equivalence relation on that set. In
particular, every payoff matrix in GNOIT (M) has the OIT game type of M .
4 Characterizing the OI-transformations of 2-person
normal form games
Here we study and answer the question: given a NF game matrix M , what are the possible
results of OI-transformations of M? That is, how is OIT type of M characterized and
constructed?
Let us first re-phrase the question: given another game matrix M̂ of the same dimen-
sions, can M̂ be obtained from M by an OI-transformation?
To answer this question, let us first consider, for technical simplicity, the case of 2-
person games. Let
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M =
A\B B1 · · · Bj · · · Bm
A1 a11, b11 · · · a1j, b1j · · · a1m, b1m
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Ai ai1, bi1 · · · aij, bij · · · aim, bim
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
An an1, bn1 · · · anj, bnj · · · anm, bnm
Further we will use a compact notation for M as follows: M =
[
aij, bij
]
i=1,...,n
j=1,...,m
.
Now, let
M̂ =
A\B B1 · · · Bj · · · Bm
A1 aˆ11, bˆ11 · · · aˆ1j, bˆ1j · · · aˆ1m, bˆ1m
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Ai aˆi1, bˆi1 · · · aˆij, bˆij · · · aˆim, bˆim
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
An aˆn1, bˆn1 · · · aˆnj, bˆnj · · · aˆnm, bˆnm
Suppose M̂ can be obtained from M by an OI-transformation
τ = {A δ
A
1 /B1−−−−→ B, . . . , A δ
A
m/Bm−−−−→ B} ∪ {B δ
B
1 /A1−−−−→ A, . . . , B δ
B
n /An−−−−→ A}
for some real numbers δA1 , . . . δ
A
m, δ
B
1 , . . . δ
B
n .
Recall, that the transformation τ changes the payoffs as follows:
aˆij = aij + δ
B
i − δAj , bˆij = bij + δAj − δBi .
Theorem 2 Let M =
[
aij, bij
]
i=1,...,n
j=1,...,m
and M̂ =
[
aˆij, bˆij
]
i=1,...,n
j=1,...,m
be 2-person NF game ma-
trices of dimensions n×m. The matrix M̂ can be obtained from M by an OI-transformation
if and only if the following two conditions hold, where cij = aˆij − aij and dij = bˆij − bij:
C1: aij + bij = aˆij + bˆij, or equivalently, dij = −cij, for all i = 1, . . . n, j = 1, . . .m.
C2: cij − ci(j+1) = c(i+1)j − c(i+1)(j+1), or equivalently, cij + c(i+1)(j+1) = ci(j+1) + c(i+1)j,
for all i = 1, . . . n− 1, j = 1, . . .m− 1.
Proof. Condition C1 is obviously necessary, because all side payments are between the
two players, so the sum of their payoffs in any given outcome remains constant.
To show the necessity of C2, a simple calculation suffice:
cij + c(i+1)(j+1) =
aˆij − aij + aˆ(i+1)(j+1) − a(i+1)(j+1) =
aij + δ
B
i − δAj − aij + a(i+1)(j+1) + δBi+1 − δAj+1 − a(i+1)(j+1) =
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δBi − δAj + δBi+1 − δAj+1.
Likewise:
ci(j+1) + c(i+1)j =
aˆi(j+1) − ai(j+1) + aˆ(i+1)j − a(i+1)j =
ai(j+1) + δ
B
i − δAj+1 − ai(j+1) + a(i+1)j + δBi+1 − δAj − a(i+1)j =
δBi − δAj+1 + δBi+1 − δAj .
Clearly, the two results are equal.
For the sufficiency, suppose C1 and C2 hold. Then, first observe that, due to C1, any
OI-transformation that transforms A’s payoffs in M into A’s payoffs in M̂ will transform
accordingly the payoffs of B in M into the payoffs of B in M̂ . So, we can ignore B’s payoffs
and consider only the transformation of the matrices of A’s payoffs.
In order to prove the existence of (real valued) payments δA1 , . . . δ
A
m, δ
B
1 , . . . δ
B
n that effect
the transformation from M to M̂ , we consider the system of mn linear equations for these
n+m unknowns that expresses the changes of A’s payoffs:
‖δBi − δAj = cij, for all i = 1, . . . n, j = 1, . . .m.
Thus, M̂ can be obtained from M by an OI-transformation precisely when that system
has a real solution. The rest is application of standard linear algebra. The matrix of the
system is 
δB1 δ
B
2 . . . δ
B
n δ
A
1 δ
A
2 . . . δ
A
m cij
1 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 c11
1 0 0 0 0 −1 0 0 c12
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 −1 c1m
0 1 0 0 −1 0 0 0 c21
0 1 0 0 0 −1 0 0 c22
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 −1 c2m
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 1 −1 0 0 0 cn1
0 0 0 1 0 −1 0 0 cn2
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 −1 cnm

We now apply to it the Gauss elimination method. Subtracting row 1 from each of
rows 2, . . . ,m, then row m+ 1 from rows m+ 2, . . . , 2m, etc., and finally row (n− 1)m+ 1
from rows (n− 1)m+ 2, . . . , nm produces:
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
δB1 δ
B
2 . . . δ
B
n δ
A
1 δ
A
2 . . . δ
A
m cij
1 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 c11
0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 0 c12 − c11
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 −1 c1m − c11
0 1 0 0 −1 0 0 0 c21
0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 0 c22 − c21
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 −1 c2m − c21
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 1 −1 0 0 0 cn1
0 0 0 1 0 −1 0 0 cn2 − cn1
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 −1 cnm − cn1

Now, note that rows k, m+ k, . . . (n− 1)m+ k have the same left hand sides, for each
k = 2, 3, . . . ,m. For the system to be consistent, the right hand sides must be equal, too.
Indeed, by consecutive applications of condition C2: c1k − c11 = c2k − c21 = . . . cnk − cn1.
Further, we subtract row k from each of m+k, . . . (n−1)m+k, for each k = 2, 3, . . . ,m
and remove the resulting 0-rows. After re-arrangement of the remaining rows we obtain:
δB1 δ
B
2 . . . δ
B
n δ
A
1 δ
A
2 . . . δ
A
m cij
1 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 c11
0 1 0 0 −1 0 0 0 c21
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 1 −1 0 0 0 cn1
0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 0 c12 − c11
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 −1 c1m − c11

Finally, subtracting row n+m− 2 from n+m− 1, then row n+m− 3 from n+m− 2,
etc, and lastly, row n+ 1 from n+ 2, we obtain:
δB1 δ
B
2 . . . δ
B
n δ
A
1 δ
A
2 . . . δ
A
m cij
1 0 0 0 −1 0 0 0 c11
0 1 0 0 −1 0 0 0 c21
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 1 −1 0 0 0 cn1
0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 0 c12 − c11
0 0 0 0 0 1 −1 0 c13 − c12
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 −1 c1m − c1(m−1)

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The ranks of the matrix and the extended matrix above are clearly equal to n+m− 1, so
the corresponding system is consistent. Moreover, it has infinitely many solutions obtained
by treating δAm as a real parameter and solving for all other unknowns in terms of it. This
completes the proof.
Corollary 3 In the case of 2× 2 payoff matrices
M =
 A\B B1 B2A1 a11, b11 a12, b12
A2 a21, b21 a22, b22
 , M̂ =
 A\B B1 B2A1 aˆ11, bˆ11 aˆ12, bˆ12
A2 aˆ21, bˆ21 aˆ22, bˆ22

the matrix M̂ can be obtained from M by an OI-transformation if and only if:
C1: aij + bij = aˆij + bˆij, for all i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
C2: c11 + c22 = c12 + c21, where cij = aˆij − aij.
Corollary 4 No OI-transformation applied to a game matrix M can produce a game ma-
trix that differs from M in only one outcome.
Consequently, OI-transformations cannot simulate the offers considered in [JW05] and
[EP11], contingent on a single outcome.
Example 5 For example, the payoff matrix A\B B1 B2A1 4, 4 0, 5
A2 3, 0 1, 1

can be OI-transformed to  A\B B1 B2A1 2, 6 2, 3
A2 0, 3 2, 0

but not to  A\B B1 B2A1 2, 6 2, 3
A2 0, 3 1, 1

neither to  A\B B1 B2A1 2, 6 3, 2
A2 0, 3 2, 0

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The condition C2 from Theorem 2 can be rewritten as a recurrent formula c(i+1)(j+1) =
c(i+1)j+ci(j+1)−cij, which suggests that all values of cij, and therefore all values of aˆij, can be
computed iteratively from some initial values along one row and one column. Therefore,
by using conditions C1 and C2, every OI-transformation can be determined locally, by
specifying the resulting payoffs for any of the two players on one row and one column. In
other words, fix a strategy profile in the transformed matrix, fix one of the players, and
assign any real payoffs for that player to all outcomes where at least one of the players
follows his strategy from the fixed strategy profile. The resulting partly defined matrix can
then be uniquely extended to one that can be obtained by an OI-transformation from the
initial matrix M . The following result formalizes that observation.
Theorem 6 Let M =
[
aij, bij
]
i=1,...,n
j=1,...,m
. Then for every fixed i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈
{1, . . . ,m}, every tuple3 of n+m−1 reals aˆi1, . . . aˆim, aˆ1j, . . . , aˆnj can be extended to a unique
payoff matrix M̂ =
[
aˆij, bˆij
]
i=1,...,n
j=1,...,m
that can be obtained from M by an OI-transformation.
Proof.
For notational simplicity, let us assume that i = 1 and j = 1 and that m ≤ n. Clearly,
the argument for any other combination of i, j is analogous. In order to determine the
matrix M̂ it suffices to determine the values of all aˆij, for i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . ,m and
then compute all values bˆij by applying condition C1 from Theorem 2.
Now, note that all values aˆij can be computed iteratively, step-by-step, by using the
identities in C2 of Theorem 2: first, compute aˆ22; then, aˆ23 and aˆ32, etc.. More precisely,
given all values along the diagonal aˆ1k, aˆ2(k−1) . . . , aˆk1, for k < n, using C2 of Theorem 2 one
can compute uniquely values for aˆ2(k+1), aˆ2k . . . , aˆ(k+1)2. When k increases between m and
n, the argument continues likewise, but for values along the diagonals aˆkm, . . . , aˆ2(m+k−2),
and then further, along the shrinking diagonals aˆkm, . . . , aˆj(m+k−j), until eventually aˆnm is
computed.
The resulting matrix M̂ =
[
aˆij, bˆij
]
i=1,...,n
j=1,...,m
satisfies the conditions C1 and C2 by con-
struction. Therefore, by Theorem 2, M̂ can be obtained from M by an OI-transformation.
The uniqueness of M̂ follows from the construction, too.
The case of arbitrary i and j is essentially the same, but the computation of the values
of the aˆpqs now propagates from aˆij in all 4 diagonal directions.
Thus, in summary, theorems 2 and 6 together say that any payoff matrix M̂ can be
obtained from matrix M by an OI-transformation by choosing suitable payoffs in one row
and one column satisfying condition C1, and then computing the rest by using the recurrent
formulae derived from condition C2.
3Note that aˆij occurs twice in this list.
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Example 7 Suppose the starting payoff matrix is
M =

A\B B1 B2 B3
A1 4, 4 6, 2 0, 6
A2 2, 6 1, 1 2, 2
A3 5, 0 0, 1 1, 5
A4 0, 0 2, 3 3, 0

and row 1 and column 1 of the transformed matrix are as follows:
M̂ =

A\B B1 B2 B3
A1 1, 7 4, 4 2, 4
A2 7, 1
A3 3, 2
A4 0, 0

The remaining entries are then computed consecutively from condition C2 of Theorem 2:
First, we obtain c22 = c21 + c12 − c11 = 5 + (−2)− (−3) = 6.
Then: c23 = c22 + c13 − c12 = 6 + 2− (−2) = 10; c32 = c31 + c22 − c21 = −2 + 6− 5 = -1,
etc. Thus, the whole matrix C =
(
cij
)
i=1,...,4
j=1,...,3
is computed:
C =

i\j 1 2 3
1 −3 −2 2
2 5 6 10
3 −2 −1 3
4 0 1 5

Eventually, from the definition of cij and Condition C1 of Theorem 2, we obtain:
M̂ =

A\B B1 B2 B3
A1 1, 7 4, 4 2, 4
A2 7, 1 7,−5 12,−8
A3 3, 2 −1, 2 4, 2
A4 0, 0 3, 2 8,−5

5 Characterizing the OI-transformations of N-person
normal form games
Generalizing these results to N -person NF games is relatively easy, but adds a substantial
notational overhead.
Let the players be indexed with {1, 2, . . . N} and consider two NF game matrices of the
same dimensions: m1 ×m2 × . . .×mN :
M =
(
〈a1i1i2...iN , a2i1i2...iN , . . . aNi1i2...iN 〉
)
ik≤mk
k=1,2,...N
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and
M̂ =
(
〈aˆ1i1i2...iN , aˆ2i1i2...iN , . . . aˆNi1i2...iN 〉
)
ik≤mk
k=1,2,...N
Let cki1i2...iN = aˆ
k
i1i2...iN
− aki1i2...iN .
Theorem 8 Let M , M̂ be N-person NF game matrices of dimensions m1×m2× . . .×mN .
The matrix M̂ can be obtained from M by an OI-transformation if and only if the following
two conditions hold:
CN1 :
∑N
j=1 aˆ
j
i1i2...iN
=
∑N
j=1 a
j
i1i2...iN
, for any ik ≤ mk, k = 1, 2, . . . N .
(The sum of all payoffs in any given outcome must remain the same.)
CN2 : For any fixed k, j = 1, 2, . . . N the difference
dj,ki1...iN := c
j
i1...ik+1...iN
− cji1...ik...iN
is the same for every i1, . . . , ij, . . . , iN such that ip ≤ mp, p = 1, . . . , N and ij < mj.
Proof.
The proofs follows the same reasoning as in the 2-person case.
The necessity of condition CN1 is obvious. To show the necessity of condition C
N
2 , we
do again simple calculations. Let M̂ be obtained from M by an OI-transformation effected
by side payment offers {δi,kj }k=1,...,N ;1≤j≤mj , where δi,kj is the side payment offered by player
i to player k 6= i contingent on k playing action j. For technical convenience we also put
δi,ij = 0 for any j. Then we have:
cji1...ij ...iN = aˆ
j
i1...ij ...iN
− aji1...ij ...iN =
N∑
i=1
δi,jij −
N∑
k=1
δj,kik .
Note that it suffices to show that
dj,ki1...ip...iN = d
j,k
i1...ip+1...iN
for any j, k, p = 1, . . . , N , i.e.,
cji1...ik+1...ip...iN − cji1...ik...ip...iN = cji1...ik+1...ip+1...iN − cji1...ik...ip+1...iN
for k < p ≤ N and likewise
cji1...ip...ik+1...iN − cji1...ip...ik...iN = cji1...ip+1...ik+1...iN − cji1...ip+1...ik...iN
for 1 ≤ p < k. Both cases are completely analogous, so let us check the first equality. It is
equivalent to
cji1...ik+1...ip...iN + c
j
i1...ik...ip+1...iN
= cji1...ik+1...ip+1...iN + c
j
i1...ik...ip...iN
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First, suppose j 6= p, k. By definition, we have for the left hand side:
cji1...ik+1...ip...iN + c
j
i1...ik...ip+1...iN
=∑N
q=1 δ
q,j
ij
−∑Nq=1
q 6=k
δj,qiq − δj,kik+1 +
∑N
q=1 δ
q,j
ij
−∑Nq=1
q 6=p
δj,qiq − δj,pip+1.
Respectively, for the right hand side:
cji1...ik+1...ip+1...iN + c
j
i1...ik...ip...iN
=∑N
q=1 δ
q,j
ij
−∑Nq=1
q 6=k,p
δj,qiq − δj,pip+1 − δj,kik+1 +
∑N
q=1 δ
q,j
ij
−∑Nq=1 δj,qiq .
A direct inspection shows that these are equal.
Now, consider the case where j = p. For the left hand side we get:
cji1...ik+1...ij ...iN + c
j
i1...ik...ij+1...iN
=∑N
q=1 δ
q,j
ij
−∑Nq=1
q 6=k
δj,qiq − δj,kik+1 +
∑N
q=1 δ
q,j
ij+1
−∑Nq=1
q 6=j
δj,qiq − δj,jij+1.
Respectively, for the right hand side:
cji1...ik+1...ij+1...iN + c
j
i1...ik...ij ...iN
=∑N
q=1 δ
q,j
ij+1
−∑Nq=1
q 6=k,j
δj,qiq − δj,jij+1 − δj,kik+1 +
∑N
q=1 δ
q,j
ij
−∑Nq=1 δj,qiq .
Again, by direct inspection we see that these are equal.
Finally, the case where j = k is completely analogous.
Now, suppose conditions CN1 and C
N
2 hold for the matricesM and M̂ , and all parameters
cji1...ij ...iN are defined as before. As in the 2-person case, we can show that the system of
equations ∥∥∥∥∥
N∑
i=1
δi,jij −
N∑
k=1
δj,kik = c
j
i1...ij ...iN
for all j, i1, . . . , ij, . . . , iN such that ip ≤ mp, p = 1, . . . , N , for the unknown real payments
{δi,kj }k=1,...,N ;1≤j≤mj , is consistent. We can use again standard linear algebra and show
that elementary matrix transformations would reduce the system to a consistent one in a
canonical form. We omit the routine, but messy technicalities.
As in the 2-person case, every OI-transformation can be determined by the payoffs for
all players in the outcomes along the rows in all coordinate directions passing from any
fixed outcome, that is, all outcomes resulting from all but one players following a fixed
strategy profile. Here is the formal result.
Theorem 9 Let
M =
(
〈a1i1i2...iN , a2i1i2...iN , . . . aNi1i2...iN 〉
)
ik≤mk
k=1,2,...N
and 〈p1 . . . pN〉 be a fixed tuple such that pk ∈ {1, . . . ,mk} for each k = 1, . . . N . Then
every tuple4
4Note that each aˆkp1p2...pN occurs N times in this list.
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T =
〈
〈aˆk1p2...pN , aˆk2p2...pN , . . . , aˆkm1p2...pN , aˆkp11...iN , aˆkp12...iN , . . . , aˆkp1m2...pN , . . . ,
aˆkp1p2...1, aˆ
k
p1p2...2
, . . . , aˆkp1p2...mN 〉 | k = 1, . . . , N
〉
satisfying condition CN1 of Theorem 8 can be extended to a unique payoff matrix
M̂ =
(
〈aˆ1i1i2...iN , aˆ2i1i2...iN , . . . aˆNi1i2...iN 〉
)
ik≤mk
k=1,2,...N
that can be obtained from M by an OI-transformation.
Proof. Given any tuple of values T satisfying the conditions of the theorem, the
extension to a matrix M̂ can be done as follows. First, we use T and the entries of M to
compute the values of all cji1...iN whose index vectors corresponding to the entries in T .
We take the identities
dj,ki1...ip...iN = d
j,k
i1...ip+1...iN
for all j, k, p = 1, . . . , N
and expand them (assuming e.g., that k < p ≤ N):
cji1...ik+1...ip...iN − cji1...ik...ip...iN = cji1...ik+1...ip+1...iN − cji1...ik...ip+1...iN
Then we rewrite them as:
cji1...ik+1...ip+1...iN = c
j
i1...ik...ip+1...iN
+ cji1...ik+1...ip...iN − cji1...ik...ip...iN
These are recurrent formulae computing the values of all cji1...iN from those computed
initially by propagating from cjp1...pN in all diagonal directions. We leave the tedious details
out. Once all cji1...iN are computed, the matrix M̂ is determined. By construction it
satisfies conditions CN1 and C
N
2 of Theorem 8, hence it can be obtained from M by an
OI-transformation. The uniqueness of M̂ follows immediately.
Example 10 Consider a 3-person game with players A1, A2, A3 of dimensions 3× 3× 2,
with 2-dimensional matrix-slices for the 2 actions of player A3 as follows:
M1 =

A1\A2 A211 A221 A231
A111 1, 2, 0 2, 3, 1 3, 1, 2
A121 2, 3, 3 3, 4, 4 4, 2, 5
A131 6, 5, 6 7, 6, 7 5, 7, 8
 , M2 =

A1\A2 A212 A222 A232
A112 1, 1, 8 2, 2, 7 3, 3, 6
A122 1, 2, 5 2, 3, 4 3, 4, 3
A132 2, 1, 2 3, 2, 1 1, 3, 0

Suppose the tuple of entries for the transformed matrix is given in terms of the outcome
(2, 2, 1) as follows:
M̂01 =

A1\A2 A211 A221 A231
A111 1, 2, 3
A121 4, 4, 0 5, 1, 5 3, 4, 4
A131 8, 4, 8
 , M̂02 =

A1\A2 A212 A222 A232
A112
A122 3, 3, 3
A132

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Note that condition CN1 of Theorem 8 is satisfied.
The corresponding partial slices of the matrix of differences cji1i2i3 = aˆ
j
i1i2i3
− aji1i2i3 are:
C01 =

A1\A2 A211 A221 A231
A111 −1,−1, 2
A121 2, 1,−3 2,−3, 1 −1, 2,−1
A131 1,−2, 1
 , C02 =

A1\A2 A212 A222 A232
A112
A122 1, 0,−1
A132

The remaining entries of that matrix are then computed consecutively by using the
identities
cji1+1i2+1i3 = c
j
i1+1i2i3
+ cji1i2+1i3 − cji1i2i3
cji1i2+1i3+1 = c
j
i1i2i3+1
+ cji1i2+1i3 − cji1i2i3 ,
cji1+1i2i3+1 = c
j
i1i2i3+1
+ cji1+1i2i3 − cji1i2i3 ,
for each j = 1, 2, 3. Thus, we first obtain
C1 =

A1\A2 A211 A221 A231
A111 −1, 3,−2 −1,−1, 2 −4, 4, 0
A121 2, 1,−3 2,−3, 1 −1, 2,−1
A131 1, 2,−3 1,−2, 1 −2, 3,−1
 ,
then:
C12 =

A1\A2 A212 A222 A232
A112 −2, 2, 0
A122 1, 4,−5 1, 0,−1 −2, 5,−3
A132 0, 1,−1

and finally:
C2 =

A1\A2 A212 A222 A232
A112 −2, 6,−4 −2, 2, 0 −5, 7,−2
A122 1, 4,−5 1, 0,−1 −2, 5,−3
A132 0, 5,−5 0, 1,−1 −3, 6,−3

Eventually, we obtain the 2-dimensional matrix-slices of M̂ for the 2 actions of player A3:
M̂1 =

A1\A2 A211 A221 A231
A111 0, 5,−2 1, 2, 3 −1, 5, 2
A121 4, 4, 0 5, 1, 5 3, 4, 4
A131 7, 7, 3 8, 4, 8 3, 10, 7

M̂2 =

A1\A2 A212 A222 A232
A112 −1, 7, 4 0, 4, 7 −2, 10, 4
A122 2, 6, 0 3, 3, 3 1, 9, 0
A132 2, 6,−3 3, 3, 0 −2, 9,−3

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In summary, as in the case of 2-person games, theorems 8 and 9 together charac-
terize precisely the payoff matrices M̂ that can be obtained from matrix M by an OI-
transformation: any of them can be obtained by choosing any strategy profile in M and
setting suitable payoffs satisfying condition CN1 for all outcomes obtained by allowing any
one, and only one, player to deviate from that strategy profile. Then all payoffs in M̂ are
computed by using the recurrent formulae derived from condition CN2 .
6 Concluding remarks
As already stated, the contributions of the present paper are purely technical: explicit and
easy to apply and use characterizations of the game matrix transformations that can be
induced by preplay offers for payments or threats for punishments in normal form games.
Even though we have not considered rationality issues that would determine which of
these transformations can be effected by offers made by rational players, we believe that
our results are of direct game-theoretic relevance, because they can be used by the players
to determine what mutually desirable transformed games (e.g., having dominant stategy
equilibria with Pareto optimal outcomes) they can achieve by exchange of preplay offers,
and then to search – by using the computational procedures that can be extracted from our
proofs – for suitable offers that would induce the necessary game matrix transformations
leading to the desired outcomes.
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